Standing on Bologna station some years ago, I was struck by the lack of express trains. Then I realised that they were all calling at a new underground station beneath the original one. In their place, the historic station was served by a frequent local train service, while a succession of long-distance container-freights rolled through. That is what High Speed 2 was supposed to do for Britain.
The case for High-Speed Rail is most often made in economic and environmental terms. But it’s a quality-of-life issue too. Anyone who has travelled on Eurostar, TGV or ICE network will realise that the quality of journey experience is generally vastly superior to most of the traditional rail network, let alone hours spent in motorway or airport queues. (The journey to my parental home used to take 3 ½ hours; five or more is now commonplace). In any case, economic prosperity and clean air are about the quality of life too.
In scrapping the northern stretch of HS2, Rishi Sunak has denied such quality to large parts of this nation. That may seem like an overstatement, but it remains true that the benefits of good infrastructure percolate the communities they serve in not always obvious ways: things that The Treasury cannot easily measure. Once again, we are being left in the dark ages compared with neighbouring countries, seemingly unable to take the steps desperately needed to modernise this country.
It is not only Sunak’s fault, though; sadly, he may be right about affordability at the current time. When HS2 was announced, the president of French Railways, Guillaume Pépy, urged the planners to learn the lessons of the French experience – key amongst which was not “gold plating” the scheme. Nonetheless, gold-plating is what we got – a failure, as so often in this country, to learn for best practice overseas. It seems we always need to reinvent the wheel to “British standards”. Well, now we will have very few (high speed) wheels at all.
It is also informative, that in the weeks when the writing was on the wall, the private sector contractors started falling over each other to propose cost-savings that they could magically find, now that it seemed the gravy-train was about to dry up. So much for private sector efficiency. Likewise, the multiple sops offered to vested-interest parties all along the route (do we really need air vents in the Chilterns disguised as farm buildings?) – which cumulatively increased costs unnecessarily. A lot of the expensive tunnelling was not necessary except for political reasons – and even some of the green mitigation measures are questionable. Yes, HS2 destroyed a small percentage of ancient woodland – but green campaigners were, sadly, part of the gravy train, demanding multiple pounds of flesh, while ignoring the fact that alternative modes of transport are far more damaging. They shouted similar things at HS1; look at it today:
The green lobby is far from immune to cakeism.
A failure to understand the logistics of rail networks seems to have played a part. Most obviously, the fact that time savings are only a function of capacity gains. The quicker trains go, the more can pass through the network. And in any case, would you engineer a new car to 1950s standards? There also seems to have been no realisation that repeatedly de-scoping the project would only reduce the viability of the rest – and yet the intended HS1-2 link, the Leeds line, and then the fast link to the Glasgow line were all surreptitiously cut.
The argument that the UK is too small to need HSR fails too, when both Japan and Italy (with similar geographies) both have successful networks. Density of population served is at least as important as large distances. That argument could have been reduced, too, had HS2 been linked to HS1, thus gaining both domestic and international economies of scale, not to mention operational synergies. As it is, a mere half-mile gap along the Euston Road will prevent the two lines from operating as one. And Heaven Forbid that northerners should have a direct service to the continent, as Londoners do! Apparently “the demand was not there” – in the same way that it is clearly not there for flights from Birmingham and Manchester airports and was “not there” for rail travel from London to the continent pre-Eurostar. Could it be something to do with Home Office paranoia – or London-centrism? Now more than ever, it would make sense to spend the money to link the stump of HS2 to HS1 – but of that common sense, there is no sign.
But there were deeper design flaws with HS2, which undoubtedly affected the business case. Terminus stations need a far larger land-take than through ones since train dwell times are much longer – which is why many cities on the continent have been busy tunnelling underneath them. They also preclude efficient route extensions in the longer term. And yet fancy termini are what were proposed in London, Birmingham and Manchester. The French advice to integrate HSR with the existing network at city centre locations seems to have been ignored.
The independent consultancy Greengauge 21 http://www.greengauge21.net/ proposed an east-west aligned through station beneath Euston and St Pancras, linking directly to HS1 and the continent. It would have made operational sense and reduced the surface land-take at Euston. It was never considered; likewise, the private sector proposal to link HS1 and HS2 via Gatwick and Heathrow, also appears never to have gained the government’s ear.
Going deeper, if the purpose of HS2 is purely domestic ‘levelling up’, why did it need to serve London at all? The capital already has the best rail services to most of the country. Much more levelling up could have been achieved by building HS2 to link together the country’s regional centres, to create an economic mass genuinely capable of counter-balancing London. Had a HSR line been built from, say, Exeter/Plymouth to Newcastle or Edinburgh/Glasgow (not very much further than from Paris to Strasbourg or Lyon – lines built in one take by SNCF – let alone Marseille), this would have linked city-regions with a combined population much greater than Greater London. It would also have been a length much more suited to the maximum efficiency of high-speed trains.
An X-shaped network also taking in South Wales and Manchester would have increased that further, as would regional parkway stations serving lesser centres along that axis. Reducing Newcastle – Bristol to around two hours (currently around five, or seven by road) would have had a huge effect on the provincial economy of this country – not to mention reducing domestic flights probably close to zero, if French experience is anything to go by. And yet it was never considered. Italy, Germany and Japan all have HSR networks that are not exclusively focused on one dominant city.
So HS2 was by no means perfect – but it was at least a start on an infrastructure network similar to what the French first opened in 1981 – more than FORTY years ago. Had we also started then (when instead Thatcherism was paring the existing network to the bone) we would not now be in this unaffordable mess.
I suspect it remains true that only a tiny minority of the British population has ever used continental high-speed rail, and thus remain in ignorance of its transformative effects on travel, let alone the wider impact. Until they experience it at first hand, indifference and opposition will probably rule. There will no doubt be claims that this shows that the public sector cannot manage major projects, or that the money would be better spent elsewhere.
On that latter point: what remains of David Cameron’s plans for major rail electrification? Or of the much-publicised structural reorganisation of the railways under Grant Shapps? Both buried after death by a thousand cuts, and conveniently swept under the carpet to almost no gain.
And of the former point: there is nothing demonstrably wrong with the public sector in this country that could not be fixed by removing the constant vacillation, changes of policy and short-termism of its political masters.